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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A proper understanding of the causes of international mi-gration suggests that punitive immigration and border 
policies tend to backﬁ re, and this is precisely what has hap-
pened in the case of the United States and Mexico. Rather 
than raising the odds that undocumented immigrants will 
be apprehended, U.S. border-enforcement policies have 
reduced the apprehension rate to historical lows and in 
the process helped transform Mexican immigration from 
a regional to a national phenomenon. Th e solution to the 
problems associated with undocumented migration is not 
open borders, but frontiers that are reasonably regulated 
on a binational basis.
Among the ﬁ ndings of this report:
    Between 1986 and 2002 the number of Border Patrol of-
ﬁ cers tripled and the number of hours they spent patrolling 
the border grew by a factor of around eight.
    Th e proportion of migrants to the United States cross-
ing at “non-traditional” sectors along the U.S.-Mexico 
border rose from 29 percent in 1988 to 64 percent in 
2002.
   Th e probability of apprehension along the U.S.-Mexico 
border fell from about 33 percent during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, to 20-30 percent in 1993 and 1994, to an 
all-time low of 5 percent in 2002.
   Th e cost of making one arrest along the U.S.-Mexico 
border increased from $300 in 1992 to $1,700 in 2002, 
an increase of 467 percent in just a decade.
    From 1980 to 1992, the cost of hiring a coyote (smuggler) 
averaged around $400 per crossing, but rose to $1,200 in 
1999 before leveling oﬀ .
 Th e average probability of return migration among 
Mexican migrants to the United States declined from 
around 45 percent prior to 1986 to around 25 percent 
in 2002.
    Between 1986 and 1996, the number of Mexicans being 
naturalized in the United States increased by a factor of 
nine.
   After 1990 the rate of Mexican population growth in 
the United States shifted sharply upward, with the 
population growing from 7 million in 1997 to around 
10 million in 2002 – an increase of 43 percent in just 
ﬁ ve years.
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INTRODUCTION
Before September 11, 2001, President Bush and President Vicente Fox of Mexico appeared to be moving toward an 
agreement to manage Mexican labor migration by expanding 
the quota for legal immigrants, creating a reasonable tempo-
rary worker program, facilitating the return of migrants and 
the investment of their dollars in Mexico, and regularizing 
the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United States. 
Unfortunately, the hijackers derailed this negotiation and 
President Fox was left standing at the border looking north-
ward with his hand extended as President Bush turned his 
back to launch the War on Terror.
In the end, the United States must learn that national se-
curity involves more than toppling ruthless dictators in distant 
lands. It also requires attending to the political stability and 
economic security of a country of 100 million people with 
whom we share a 2,000-mile border. Th e administration’s 
inattention to migration in the context of North American 
integration has undermined the stature and standing of 
Mexico’s ﬁ rst democratically elected President in 70 years; 
and every day that passes without a labor agreement makes 
it more diﬃ  cult for Mexico to realize its full potential for 
economic growth.
Rather than accepting immigration as a logical conse-
quence of America’s dominant position at the core of a global 
market economy, U.S. political leaders have enacted repressive 
unilateral policies that seek to create the impression that immi-
gration is not occurring, that U.S. borders are “under control,” 
and that U.S. citizens are protected from the presumed ill eﬀ ects 
of immigrants. In fact, such policies achieve the opposite: im-
migration continues, but in a way that undermines the status 
and welfare of U.S. residents and immigrants alike.
Indeed, a proper understanding of the causes of inter-
national migration suggests that punitive immigration and 
border policies tend to backﬁ re, and this is precisely what has 
happened in the case of the United States and Mexico. Rather 
than raising the odds that undocumented immigrants will be 
apprehended, U.S. border-enforcement policies have reduced 
the apprehension rate to historical lows and in the process 
helped transform Mexican immigration from a regional to a 
national phenomenon. Rather than discouraging Mexicans 
from coming, these policies have induced millions of legal 
immigrants to become U.S. citizens, thereby allowing them 
to petition for the entry of relatives under U.S. immigration 
law. Th e net result has been an unprecedented increase in the 
number of Mexicans living north of the border.
BUILDUP AT THE BORDER
In 1986 the United States embarked on a determined eﬀ ort to restrict Mexican immigration and tighten bor-
der enforcement. Th e arrival of this new era was heralded 
by passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) in October of that year, which decisively expanded 
funding for the U.S. Border Patrol. Th e renewed eﬀ ort at 
border enforcement intensiﬁ ed around 1994, just as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took ef-
fect and promoted greater integration of the Mexican and 
U.S. economies. During the 1980s, border control was 
framed by U.S. politicians as an issue of “national security” 
and illegal migration was portrayed as an “alien invasion.” 
Between 1986 and 1996, Congress and the President un-
dertook a remarkable series of restrictive actions to reassure 
citizens that they were working hard to “regain control” of 
the Mexico-U.S. border.1
Despite expectations that IRCA would somehow slow 
unsanctioned Mexican migration, both legal and illegal im-
migration from Mexico continued to rise, and Congress 
returned to the drawing board in 1990 to pass another revision 
of U.S. immigration law. Th is legislation focused strongly on 
border control and authorized even more funds for the hir-
ing of additional Border Patrol oﬃ  cers. Early in the Clinton 
administration (1993-94), the agency developed a new border-
enforcement strategy that took full advantage of this increased 
funding. Known as “prevention through deterrence,” the 
strategy aimed to prevent Mexicans from crossing the border 
in key sectors in order to avoid having to deport them later.2 
Th e strategy originated in September of 1993, when the Border 
Patrol Chief in El Paso, Texas, launched Operation Blockade
– an all-out eﬀ ort to prevent illegal border-crossing within the 
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Figure 2:
INDICATORS OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT 
1966-2002 (1986=1.0)
El Paso sector. Within a few months, immigrants had been 
induced to go around the imposing wall of enforcement, and 
traﬃ  c through El Paso itself was reduced to a trickle.
Oﬃ  cials in Washington took note of the favorable out-
come in El Paso and incorporated this approach into the 
Border Patrol’s national strategic plan for 1994. In October 
of that year, a second mobilization was authorized for the 
busiest sector of the border: San Diego, California. Operation 
Gatekeeper installed high-intensity ﬂ oodlights to illuminate 
the border day and night and built an eight-foot high steel 
fence along 14 miles of border from the Paciﬁ c Ocean to the 
foothills of the Coastal Range.3  Border Patrol oﬃ  cers were 
stationed every few hundred yards behind this formidable 
steel wall, and a new array of sophisticated hardware was 
deployed in the no-man’s-land it faced.4
Th is buildup of enforcement resources was further ac-
celerated by Congress when it passed the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 
Once again, the legislation focused heavily on deterrence, 
authorizing funds for the construction of two additional layers 
of fencing in San Diego and enacting tougher penalties for 
smugglers, undocumented migrants, and visa over-stayers. 
It also included funding for the purchase of new military 
technology and provided funds for hiring 1,000 Border Patrol 
agents a year through 2001 to bring the total strength of the 
Border Patrol up to 10,000 oﬃ  cers.5
Th e eﬀ ect of these successive policy actions on border 
enforcement is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows increases 
relative to 1986 in the budget of the Border Patrol and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (CIS) of the Department of 
Homeland Security. In 1986, the INS budget stood at just 
$474 million and that of the Border Patrol was $151 million. 
IRCA began the acceleration of funding for border enforce-
ment, but it was the innovation of border blockades in 1993 
that really opened the spigot of money. By 2002 the Border 
Patrol’s budget had reached $1.6 billion and that of the INS 
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stood a $6.2 billion, ten and thirteen times their 1986 values, 
respectively. With this additional revenue, more Border Patrol 
oﬃ  cers were hired, as shown in Figure 2.  Between 1986 and 
2002 the number of Border Patrol oﬃ  cers tripled and the 
number of hours they spent patrolling the border (“linewatch” 
hours) grew by a factor of around eight.
Figure 1:
BUDGET OF INS AND BORDER                              
PATROL 1966-2002 (1986=1.0)
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BORDER ENFORCEMENT BACKFIRES
The fundamental weakness of blockading particular sec-tors of the Mexican border is that there are always other, 
less-defended sectors within which to cross. Th e mobilization 
of enforcement resources in El Paso and San Diego simply 
diverted the ﬂ ow of migrants into Arizona, causing U.S. 
authorities to launch new blockades there, which in turn 
channeled the ﬂ ow into New Mexico and the Rio Grande 
Valley of Texas, bringing about a mobilization of enforcement 
resources in those sectors. However, the border is 2,000 miles 
long and systematically blockading this entire length in the 
manner of San Diego or El Paso is prohibitively expensive.6
Ultimately, the net eﬀ ect of the border blockades has 
been to push undocumented Mexican migrants into crossing 
at more remote and less accessible locations in mountains, 
deserts, and untamed sections of the Rio Grande River. Th e 
tragic result for undocumented migrants has been a tripling of 
their death rate during entry.7  But if migrants are more likely 
to die while crossing remote sectors of the border, they are also 
less likely to be caught, and a little-known consequence of U.S. 
border-enforcement policy has been that it has decreased the 
odds that undocumented Mexican migrants are apprehended 
while attempting to enter the United States.
Figure 3 draws upon data from the Mexican Migra-
tion Project (MMP) at Princeton University and the 
University of Guadalajara to show trends in the location 
of border-crossing and the probability of apprehension 
among undocumented Mexicans from 1980 to 2002, the 
latest year for which reliable estimates are available. From 
1980 through 1987, the proportion of migrants crossing 
in either Tijuana-San Diego or Juarez-El Paso increased. By 
1988 around 70 percent of all border crossings occurred 
within these two “traditional” sectors. Th e militarization of 
the border begun by IRCA in 1986 was naturally targeted 
to these high-volume points of entry, a tendency that was 
ampliﬁ ed beginning in 1993-1994 with the launching of 
blockade operations. As a result, the proportion of migrants 
crossing at “non-traditional” sectors along the border has 
steadily risen from 29 percent in 1988 to 64 percent in 
2002. Obviously, undocumented migrants are simply going 
around hardened sectors of the border.
Figure 3:
TRENDS IN USE OF NON-TRADITIONAL CROSSING POINTS AND                
             THE PROBABILITY OF APPREHENSION
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Figure 4:
PROBABILITY OF TAKING A FIRST UNDOCUMENTED TRIP 1980-2002
Th rough the 1970s and early 1980s, the probability of 
apprehension along the border was relatively steady and aver-
aged about 33 percent: roughly one third of attempted entries 
led to an apprehension. Th ereafter, however, the probability of 
apprehension fell into the 20-30 percent range and following 
the implementation of operations Blockade and Gatekeeper in 
1993 and 1994, the likelihood of arrest plummeted. By 2002 
the probability of apprehension had reached an all-time low of 
just 5 percent! Rather than increasing the odds of apprehension, 
U.S. border policies have reduced them to record lows.
Given this fact, it is not surprising that U.S. border-en-
forcement policies have had little detectable eﬀ ect in deterring 
undocumented migrants from leaving for the United States 
in the ﬁ rst place. Figure 4 uses MMP data to compute the 
probability that Mexican men and women took a ﬁ rst trip 
to the United States from 1980 onward. Th ere is little evi-
dence in either series that the border buildup has dissuaded 
undocumented Mexicans from heading northward. Th ere is 
considerable variation in the trend for males, whose prob-
abilities of ﬁ rst undocumented migration ﬂ uctuate between 
.015 and .025, with variations being closely tied to eco-
nomic conditions on both sides of the border.8  Although 
the likelihood of female migration is much lower, the trend 
is virtually ﬂ at. Available data thus indicate that the inﬂ ow 
8 ibid.
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CRACKDOWN ON LEGAL                          
IMMIGRANTS BACKFIRES
Over the same time period as the border-enforcement buildup, legal immigration from Mexico has also 
grown, despite measures enacted by Congress to make it 
more diﬃ  cult to qualify for documents and to reduce the 
rights and privileges of legal immigrants once they are here. 
Figure 5 shows trends in legal immigration from Mexico 
using oﬃ  cial statistics. In response to an anti-immigrant 
backlash in the early 1990s, Congress in 1996 barred lawful 
permanent residents (LPRs) from receiving federally-sup-
ported public beneﬁ ts and ﬁ nancial assistance. Th is action 
dramatically increased the incentives for naturalization 
among LPRs. Moreover, at about the same time, Mexico 
enacted a new policy of allowing dual nationality, permit-
ting those who naturalize in the United States to retain 
their Mexican citizenship. Both events occurred just as the 
2.3 million Mexicans who legalized under IRCA between 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
of undocumented Mexican immigrants continues apace, but 
that once at the border the odds of being apprehended are 
much lower. As a result, more undocumented migrants are 
gaining entry to the United States than ever before.
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1988 and 1990 became eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship 
(following ﬁ ve years as LPRs).
 Th e end result was predictable: a huge and unprec-
edented surge in the number of Mexicans naturalizing to U.S. 
citizenship. As Figure 5 shows, between 1986 and 1996, 
the number of Mexicans being naturalized increased by a 
factor of nine. Th is surge in naturalizations fell in 1997 as 
the cohort of Mexicans legalized under IRCA passed and 
the INS bureaucracy staggered under the administrative 
load. Administrative reforms reduced INS backlogs in 1998, 
however, and the number of Mexicans acquiring citizenship 
once again mushroomed to nearly seven times its 1986 level. 
Although the latest data show declines in the years 2001 
and 2002, the rate of naturalization among Mexicans is still 
running at three times its 1986 level.
If by stripping legal immigrants of social rights Congress 
sought to discourage legal immigration from Mexico, the 
eﬀ ort backﬁ red. In fact, it encouraged millions of Mexicans 
who otherwise would have happily remained in LPR status 
to apply for U.S. citizenship, the acquisition of which in 
turn increased the rate of legal immigration. Although LPRs 
have the right to petition for the legal entry of their spouses 
and minor children, these visas are limited in number and 
immigrants must wait in line, typically for many years in 
countries such as Mexico, where the quota of numerically 
limited visas is perennially ﬁ lled. Once an LPR becomes a 
U.S. citizen, however, spouses and minor children, as well as 
parents, are entitled to enter outside the quotas, not subject 
to any numerical limitation whatsoever. In addition, U.S. 
citizens acquire the right to sponsor the entry of broth-
ers and sisters as well as older, married children and their 
spouses, though these categories are subject to numerical 
limitations.
In short, each person who becomes a U.S. citizen ac-
quires new and powerful rights under U.S. immigration 
law to sponsor the entry of relatives, many of whom are not 
subject to numerical limitations. Each naturalization thus 
creates the potential for more immigration in the future. By 
taking rights away from LPRs, Congress pushed Mexicans 
decisively toward naturalization and therefore guaranteed
the acceleration of legal immigration from Mexico. Th e 
dashed line in Figure 5 shows a “bump” in legal entries cor-
responding to the surge in naturalizations during 1996 and 
Figure 5:
NUMBER OF MEXICAN PERMANENT RESIDENTS, NON-QUOTA IMMIGRANTS,       
AND NATURALIZATIONS 1966-2002 (1986=1.0)
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a steady increase thereafter. By 2002, legal immigration was 
running at more than three times its 1986 level. Reﬂ ecting 
the increased sponsorship of entries by U.S. citizens rather 
than LPRs, the number of “non-quota” immigrants not 
subject to numerical limitations also began to grow rapidly 
in 1994 and accelerated markedly after 1996. By 2002 it 
was approaching four times its 1986 level.
THE COSTS OF MISGUIDED POLICIES
Although the size of the Border Patrol budget increased by a factor of 10 between 1986 and 2002, and the number 
of Border Patrol Agents tripled, more Mexican immigrants 
– both documented and undocumented – are arriving than 
ever before. Th e combination of huge budget increases with 
rising immigration rates suggests a marked deterioration in 
the eﬃ  ciency of U.S. border enforcement. American taxpayers 
are spending far, far more to achieve much less in the way of 
deterrence and relatively fewer arrests along the border. Th is hy-
pothesis is conﬁ rmed by the data in Figure 6, which divides the 
Border Patrol’s annual budget by the number of apprehensions 
achieved along the Mexico-U.S. border, expressing the average 
cost of arresting one undocumented Mexican migrant.
7
 Before 1986 the cost of one apprehension was roughly 
constant at around $100 per arrest.  Beginning with the 
passage of IRCA in 1986, however, the cost of enforcement 
began to rise, tripling to around $300 per arrest in 1989 before 
stabilizing for a time. Beginning with the launching of opera-
tions Blockade and Gatekeeper in 1993 and 1994, however, 
the cost of making one arrest immediately jumped to more 
than $400 and then gradually increased to $600 in 1999. Th e 
events of September 11, 2001, brought another huge infusion 
of resources to the Border Patrol that was in no way connected 
to the threat of either terrorism or undocumented migration 
emanating from south of the border. Th e cost of an apprehen-
sion then skyrocketed. Whereas the cost of making one arrest 
along the border stood at just $300 in 1992, ten years later it 
reached $1,700, an increase of 467 percent in just a decade.
If this increase in the cost of enforcement, expensive as it 
was, had slowed the ﬂ ow of undocumented immigrants, then 
one might consider it money well spent. But as we have seen, in 
2002 the probability of apprehension was lower than at any point 
in the modern history of Mexico-U.S. migration and the number 
of Mexicans entering the United States was greater than ever. 
Whatever one thinks about the goal of reducing migration from 
Mexico, U.S. policies have clearly failed, and at great cost to U.S. 
Figure 6:
COST OF MAKING ONE APPREHENSION ON THE            
MEXICO-US BORDER 1980-2002
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taxpayers. Th e money allocated to border enforcement since 1986 
has been a complete and total waste of billions of dollars.
Data presented so far have shown that, despite massive 
increases in border enforcement and congressional actions 
undertaken to discourage legal immigration, the number of 
legal and illegal entries from Mexico has continued to grow, 
implying the waste of billions of dollars (not to mention hun-
dreds of lives) in the futile eﬀ ort to prevent the movement of 
labor within a rapidly integrating North American economy. 
As grim as this assessment may be, it gets worse. Not only have 
U.S. policies failed to reduce the inﬂ ow of people from Mexico, 
they have perversely reduced the outﬂ ow of people back to 
Mexico and thus produced an unprecedented increase in the 
population of the United States. America’s unilateral eﬀ ort 
to prevent a decades-old pattern of migration from continu-
ing has paradoxically transformed a circular ﬂ ow of Mexican 
workers into a settled population of families and dependents 
in the United States.
Rather than electing not to enter the United States without 
inspection, undocumented immigrants quite rationally invested 
more money to minimize the risks and maximize the odds of a 
successful border crossing. As U.S. authorities deployed a more 
formidable array of personnel and materiel at key points along 
the border, smugglers on the Mexican side simply upgraded 
the package of services they oﬀ ered. Smugglers used to simply 
accompany small parties of undocumented migrants on foot 
across well-trod pathways from Tijuana to San Diego and deliver 
them to some urban setting. Now they had to transport people 
to remote sectors of the border, guide them across, and transfer 
them on the other side to other personnel who would arrange 
transport to destinations throughout the United States.
Th e net eﬀ ect of U.S. policies, in other words, was to in-
crease the quality and price of border-smuggling services. After 
the various blockades were launched, undocumented migrants 
faced rising out-of-pocket costs to ensure a successful border 
crossing. Th e extent of this increase is indicated by Figure 7, 
which shows the average amount that undocumented migrants 
paid someone to smuggle them into the United States by year. 
From 1980 to 1992, the cost of hiring a coyote or pollero (as 
smugglers are colloquially labeled) was relatively ﬂ at, averag-
ing around $400 per crossing. With the launching of the new 
strategy of prevention through deterrence in 1993, however, the 
cost of purchasing a smuggler’s services rose to around $1,200 
in 1999 before leveling oﬀ .
8
Figure 7:
COST OF HIRING A BORDER                        
SMUGGLER 1980-2002.
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Figure 8:
PROBABILITY OF RETURNING TO MEXICO 
WITHIN 12 MONTHS OF ENTRY 1980-2001
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 In other words, compared to 1990 and prior years, by 
2000 it cost undocumented migrants three times as much to 
gain entry to the United States. If the ﬁ rst order of business on 
any trip to the United States is to recover this cost, then hold-
ing constant the rate of remuneration and hours worked per 
week, the trip would have to be three times as long. Although 
militarizing the border may not have reduced the inﬂ ow, it did 
substantially increase the length of trips and thereby reduced 
the outﬂ ow back to Mexico.
Another way of viewing the increase in trip lengths is in 
terms of a decline in the probability of return: fewer migrants 
return within one year of their original entry. Th is fact is il-
lustrated in Figure 8, which uses MMP data to compute the 
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probability of returning to Mexico within 12 months of entry. 
As can be seen, before IRCA the annual likelihood of return 
migration ﬂ uctuated between 40 percent and 50 percent 
with no clear trend. After 1986, however, we observe a steady, 
sustained decline in the likelihood of return migration, which 
bottoms out at 24 percent in 1996 and begins to oscillate. 
Roughly speaking, the average probability of return migration 
goes from around 45 percent before IRCA to around 25 percent 
today. If 1,000 migrants were to enter the United States each 
year at the former rate, 950 or 95 percent would be back in 
Mexico within ﬁ ve years and the average length of trip would 
be 1.7 years. At the latter rate, of 1,000 migrants who entered 
the United States within a given year, only 763 or 76 percent 
would have returned to Mexico within ﬁ ve years and the aver-
age trip duration would have grown to 3.5 years.
If the number of undocumented Mexicans entering 
the United States each year after 1986 remained constant 
or was increasing, as the evidence suggests, and the prob-
ability of return migration was simultaneously falling, 
then only one outcome is possible: a sharp increase in 
the size of the undocumented population living in the 
United States at any point in time. In demographic 
terms, if the number of entries to a population persists 
or grows while the number of exits falls, it can only 
grow.
The growth in the size of the Mexican population of 
the United States as recorded by the U.S. Census Bureau is 
shown in Figure 9. From 1980 through the mid 1990s, the 
Mexican population of the United States grew at a steady 
if rapid rate, roughly tripling in the 15 years from 1980 to 
1995. After 1990 the rate of Mexican population growth 
shifts sharply upward, with the population growing from 7 
million in 1997 to around 10 million in 2002--an increase 
of 43 percent in just five years. After results from the 2000 
Census were published, it was evident that Hispanics had 
overtaken blacks to become the nation’s largest minority 
far earlier than most demographers had predicted.
A NEW APPROACH TO                                           
MEXICAN IMMIGRATION
The solution to the problems associated with undocu-mented migration is not open borders, but frontiers 
that are reasonably regulated on a binational basis. Under 
current U.S. immigration law, all countries are allotted 
the same quota of 20,000 legal immigrants per year, no 
matter what their size or relationship to the United States. 
Th us, our largest and closest neighbor and most impor-
tant trading partner has the same limited access to U.S. 
visas as Botswana, Nepal, and Paraguay. A more realistic 
policy would recognize Mexico’s unique status by increas-
ing the annual immigrant quota, establishing a ﬂ exible 
temporary labor program, and regularizing the status of 
those already here. By bringing the ﬂ ow of immigrants 
above board, we would mitigate the downward pressures 
on wages and working conditions in the United States 
while raising tax revenues that could be used to oﬀ set the 
costs of immigration and to assist Mexico in overcoming 
the market failures that motivate so many people to move 
north of the border.
Speciﬁ cally, I propose that the United States create a 
new category of temporary visa that permits the bearer to 
enter, live, and work in the country without restriction 
for two years, with an option for renewal once in the life-
time of the migrant, but only after he or she has returned 
home. Th e visas would be issued to persons and not tied to 
speciﬁ c jobs. Such a program would guarantee the rights 
of temporary migrants, protect the interests of American 
workers, and satisfy the demands of employers by moving 
toward a relatively free and open North American labor 
market.
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I would make these new visas generously available to 
residents of Canada and Mexico. If 300,000 two-year visas 
were issued annually, there would be 600,000 temporary 
migrants working in the United States at any time, a small 
share of the U.S. workforce but a large fraction of undocu-
mented migrants. Moreover, I would charge a $400 fee to 
migrants for each visa issued, to be paid up front in cash 
or in low-interest installments from the migrant’s U.S. 
earnings. Th is money could be used for the beneﬁ t of the 
migrants themselves, in ways described below. Th e data 
presented above indicate that migrants are perfectly will-
ing to pay this amount to gain entry to the United States, 
but up until now the money has gone into the pockets 
of border smugglers rather than toward more beneﬁ cial 
purposes. A $400 fee paid by 300,000 temporary migrants 
per year would yield annual revenues of $120 million.
As an additional source of revenue, the government could 
earmark federal taxes (Social Security, Medicare, and income 
taxes) withheld from the paychecks of temporary migrants for 
immigration-related initiatives. If 600,000 temporary migrants 
were to earn annual incomes of just $15,000 and have taxes 
withheld at a rate of only 25 percent, the annual revenues would 
be $225 million per year. Additional revenues could be raised 
by drastically reducing the personnel and resources devoted to 
border enforcement. Th ere is no evidence whatsoever that the 
costly militarization of the U.S. border has raised the odds of 
apprehension or prevented the entry of undocumented im-
migrants, but the human costs in terms of injury and death 
have been great. Th e Border Patrol would be equally eﬀ ective, 
more eﬃ  cient, and violate fewer human rights with a smaller 
number of oﬃ  cers assigned to the border.
In addition to reducing the size of the Border Patrol, I 
would redeploy its enforcement eﬀ ort from the border to the 
interior of the United States, targeting regions of the country 
and economic sectors known to employ immigrant workers. 
Rather than focusing on the identiﬁ cation and apprehension 
of undocumented immigrants, however, worksite inspections 
would vigorously enforce U.S. tax, labor, environmental, 
and occupational health and safety laws, eliminating many 
of the incentives for employing undocumented immigrants 
and ensuring that employers are deducting taxes to ﬁ nance 
immigration initiatives. It is essential that employers be held 
responsible for violations, even if workers are hired through 
a labor subcontractor.
With revenues from visa fees and tax withholding from 
temporary migrants, the United States would join with Mexi-
can authorities to establish a binational insurance program 
that allows all migrants to purchase low-cost insurance for 
a variety of purposes, giving them a means of risk manage-
ment other than migration. Th e revenues would also be used 
to establish a binational agency for economic development 
that would make matching grants to Mexican communities 
for the construction or improvement of local infrastructure. 
Such an agency would oﬀ er migrants a way of multiplying 
the positive beneﬁ ts of their remittances back to Mexico (cur-
rently on the order of $20 billion per year) by pooling them 
for local development initiatives and doubling them dollar 
for dollar. Migrant-generated revenues would also be used 
to create a migrant savings bank that pays dollar depositors 
above-market interest rates as a means of attracting earnings 
back to Mexico, and would make low-interest loans to indi-
viduals and families for both production and consumption, 
using revenues from visa fees and tax withholding to ﬁ nance 
the subsidies.
It is also imperative to increase the number of perma-
nent resident visas available to Mexicans to 100,000 per 
year. Th e current quota of 20,000 visas for a nation to which 
we are so closely bound by history, geography, and treaty 
is absurdly low, yielding excessively long waiting times for 
many legally qualiﬁ ed immigrants and virtually guarantee-
ing undocumented migration. At the same time, however, I 
would eliminate the preference category that confers rights 
of entry on brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens. Th is is an 
unnecessary provision that bears more responsibility than 
any other feature of U.S. immigration law for reinforcing 
the process of chain migration that propels so much im-
migration from Mexico.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing actions go well beyond what President Bush proposed in his January 7, 2004, speech on 
immigration reform, but are not so distant from reforms 
broached by senators and representatives in the wake of 
his announcement. If enacted, these policy reforms will 
not eliminate undocumented immigration from Mexico, 
of course, nor solve all of the problems associated with it. 
Th ey will, however, reverse the deleterious consequences 
of our current policies by eliminating the black market 
in immigrant labor, minimizing the long-term settlement 
of Mexican immigrants, encouraging the repatriation of 
capital and people to Mexico, promoting economic growth 
within migrant-sending communities, and overcoming the 
prevailing weaknesses in Mexican capital, credit, and insur-
ance markets.
In the short run, the disruptions that follow from the 
consolidation of the North American market will continue 
to produce migrants to the United States. But long-term 
economic growth and development within Mexico will 
gradually eliminate most of the incentives for international 
migration. We should not seek to stamp out the inevitable 
migratory ﬂ ows, but move North America toward a more 
balanced economy in which fewer Mexicans will experience 
the need to migrate northward.
NOTE: Portions of this report, along with a discussion of U.S. trade policies, were published in Backﬁ re at the Border: Why Enforcement  
without Legalization Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration. Washington, DC: Cato Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies, June 13, 2005.
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